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Nagle: Terrorism and Universal Jurisdiction: Opening a Pandora's Box?

TERRORISM AND UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION:
OPENING A PANDORA’S BOX?
Luz E. Nagle*
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between terrorism and international criminal law
has provoked a good deal of discussion in the wake of the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York City and at the Pentagon
in Washington, D.C. A particularly challenging issue pertains to
whether terrorism is an international crime or a transnational crime,
and if and in what context offenders and offenses, to which we affix
the label of terrorist and terrorism, should or can be subject to the
limited jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and
other international and national criminal tribunals.
While there are those who feel that terrorism should fall under the
purview of universal jurisdiction, some scholars1 argue that even
while the “international state of emergency”2 triggered by the events
of September 11 generated worldwide, extensive, and severe
legislation internationalizing a crime that is mainly “set deep within
national borders,”3 acts of terrorism fail to merit ICC jurisdiction
because the parameters of such acts remain undefined due to politics.
The ICC “would be hard pressed to fulfill the goals of deterrence and

* Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. The author wishes to thank Ms. Aliza
Hochmon and Graduate Research Assistant Sarah Moses for their valuable research and editing
assistance in the drafting of this article. Ms. Moses, in particular, provided exceptional feedback and
valuable editorial suggestions in the final drafting of the article. I am also grateful to international
criminal law scholar Ms. Noelle Quenivet, who graciously provided important comments and
recommendations during the writing of the article.
1. See, e.g., Naomi Norberg, Terrorism and International Criminal Justice: Dim Prospects for a
Future Together, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 11 (2010). Crimes of terrorism can and should qualify “as
crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute,” and the ICC should have jurisdiction over acts of
terrorism. Vincent-Joël Proulx, Rethinking the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in the
Post September 11th Era: Should Acts of Terrorism Qualify as Crimes Against Humanity, 19 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 1009, 1010 (2004).
2. Norberg, supra note 1, at 35.
3. Id. at 13.
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justice for victims,”4 and in trying to do so some nations might
respond to internal and external terrorist threats by erecting barriers
to suppress fundamental rights “in the name of combating what
seems to have become the ‘crime of crimes’ of the 21st century.”5
The notion of adding terrorism to a similar level of universally
recognized extreme crimes elicits several concerns. First, when we
talk about terrorism, what are we talking about? Are we talking about
actions of violence committed in different nations by the same group
with the intent of terrorizing and scaring other nations who think they
may be next? Or are we talking about terrorist groups confining their
operations within a specific national territory, but having a presence
and source of support in other nations, such as the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) that has long maintained a global
network of cells committed to specific tasks and responsibilities for
furthering its terrorist activities on Colombian soil? How the
international community defines terrorism will have several
ramifications for international justice.
The aim of this article is to make the case that, contrary to the
current opinions expressed by many influential international law
scholars and practitioners, terrorism is not a suitable crime for
universal jurisdiction. Supporting such a “minority” position requires
looking carefully at the difference between international crimes and
transnational crimes in the context of what constitutes crimes against
humanity as recognized under international law and whether
terrorism, absent a clear understanding of its definition, should be a
crime subject to universal jurisdiction. We will first examine the
distinctions between international crime and transnational crime,
providing a context for a discussion of terrorism in both domestic and
international manifestations. We will then look at how nations have
responded to terrorism through the drafting of legislation and how
that legislation has been correctly or incorrectly applied to crimes
construed to be terrorist in nature and intent. We will also look at
how immigration laws and procedures have been implemented to
4. Id. at 14.
5. Id.
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combat terrorism and whether such measures taken to control
terrorist acts provide a proper wall of protection. Finally, we will
consider whether universal jurisdiction is the proper forum for
prosecuting acts of terrorism and if so, whether domestic terrorist acts
should also be subject to universal jurisdiction where it can be
demonstrated that the acts committed constitute a transnational scope
and rise to the level of violations of international humanitarian law
and crimes against humanity.
I. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL
AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMES
A. The Nature of International Crimes
If a society’s essential values drive it to designate a conduct as a
crime, then criminal law is a barometer of those values and is
applicable to both domestic and international acts that affront and
disrupt the rule of law. Taken a step further, crimes construed to be
so egregious as to shock humanity, such as genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes,6 became international crimes by
consensus of the international community. As a result, such crimes
became subject to the jurisdiction of limited international tribunals,
such as those created by the world community to investigate and try
horrific acts committed in Bosnia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Lebanon,
Cambodia, and East Timor.7
While international consensus on what constitutes crimes against
the universality of mankind is paramount to the justification of
tribunals endorsed and supported by an international authority and
comprised of an international character, the reason for the
international community to have reached such consensus compels a
discussion of elements that seem at times taken for granted. First,
international crimes are created by customary international law,
6. As defined in Articles 5–8 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90,
available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf.
7. For an overview of current tribunals and special courts, see Global Policy Forum, International
Criminal Tribunals and Special Courts, http://www.globalpolicy.org/international-justice/internationalcriminal-tribunals-and-special-courts.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
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resulting from the desire of nations to conform to a consistent
practice of and respect for legal obligations.8 Customary law binds
nations in the absence of a treaty or convention in such a manner that
a “state cannot opt out of its duty to conform to a general
international law.”9 It imposes upon all nations a moral imperative
and a shared sense of deeply rooted values.10
Second, the values of the international community have dictated
that conducts violating basic human rights in ways that “shock the
conscience of humanity”11 constitute international crimes. Such
conduct violates the “inherent values and interest of the community
of nations and therefore concerns the ‘international community as a
whole.’”12 International consensus to criminalize such behavior is
reached by virtue of the values protected and the interests threatened.
The values and interests transcend individual goals, national borders,
and sovereignty limitations because they are common to and affect all
nations equally. Even if international crimes only occur in a few
nations, their immediate and direct effect endangers the well being of
the world as a whole and threatens the international peace and
security of mankind.13 In such events, the international community,
through the authority of the United Nations Security Council,14
8. See Theodor Meron, Customary Law, CRIMES OF WAR, http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/
customary-law.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2009).
9. See Holning Lau, Rethinking the Persistent Objector Doctrine in International Human Rights
Law, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 495, 498 (2005–2006). It is important to note that a State may avoid their
obligations under customary law if it has been a “persistent objector” to the norm. Id. The State’s
objection must be consistent and prior to the norm’s emergence as customary law. Id.
10. See Meron, supra note 8.
11. The preamble to the Rome Statute of the ICC, states that the parties to the statute are “[m]indful
that during this century millions of children, women and men have been victims of unimaginable
atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.” Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 6.
12. Otto Triffterer, Security Interests of the Community of States, Basis and Justification of an
International Criminal Jurisdiction Versus Protection of National Security Information’, Article 72
Rome Statute, in NAT’L SEC. & INT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE 53, 63 (Herwig Roggemann & Petar Šarčević,
eds., 2002). See also the definition of gross and large-scale violations of human rights as an international
crime by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/10 (June 8, 1999).
13. The preamble to the Rome Statute of the ICC provides that the parties to the statute
“[r]ecogniz[e] that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world.” Rome
Statute of the ICC, supra note 6; see also Triffterer, supra note 12.
14. Under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council is charged with maintaining the
international peace and security by establishing peacekeepers, imposing economic sanctions, authorizing
military action under U.N. Charter articles 39–41, and issuing resolutions establishing ad hoc tribunals
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acquires a legitimate right to intrude in the sacrosanct sovereignty of
a nation and may take punitive measures, such as economic
sanctions, use of force, establishing an ad hoc tribunal,15 or
authorizing a national or international force to arrest an indicted
suspect.16
Third, in order to prevent damage to the values protected by the
international community and to avoid impunity from those
committing core crimes,17 international law provides for
universality—the principle of law that “permits a state to exercise
jurisdiction over perpetrators of certain offenses considered
particularly heinous or harmful to mankind, regardless of any nexus
the state may have with the offense, the offender, or the victim.”18
Thus, universal jurisdiction permits a state to prosecute those accused
of committing serious crimes regardless of whether they are in
violation of the domestic law of the country wherein the crimes are
perpetrated.
The effect a crime has on peace and security triggers different
reactions by the international community. If a crime constitutes “a
threat to international peace and security”19 like international crimes,
the international community can act through the Security Council.20
for international prosecutors to investigate international crimes. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Use Courts, Not
Combat, to Get the Bad Guys: Pre-emptive Justice, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 20, 2003, at 9, available
at http://www.princeton.edu/~slaughtr/Commentary/CourtsNotCombat.pdf (noting that the Security
Council also has the power to create ad hoc tribunals for those nations that have yet to be part of the
ICC).
15. Slaughter, supra note 14, at 9 (noting that the Security Council also has the power to create ad
hoc tribunals for those nations that have yet to be part of the ICC).
16. Id. at 9 (noting that the Security Council, once an indictment has been issued by the prosecutor,
could determine in the interests of international peace and security to authorize an international or
national force to arrest the indicted suspect).
17. These are the crimes derived from Nuremberg: crimes against humanity, genocide, crimes
against peace, and war crimes. General Assembly Resolution 95(I) of 1946 provides excellent support
for this statement. G.A. Res. 95 (I), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1/95 (Dec. 11, 1946).
18. STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 161 (2001).
19. See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Statute of the Tribunal,
http://www.un.org/ictr/statute.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2009). For the determination of the conflict as
being non-international, see The Secretary-General, Report on Practical Arrangements for the Effective
Functioning of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, Recommending Arusha as the Seat of the
Tribunal, U.N. Doc. S/1995/134 (Feb. 13, 1995).
20. Conversely, this could also mean that any time the Security Council acts under Article 39 of the
U.N. Charter, the crimes dealt with could be construed as international crimes.
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For example, even if the conflict in Rwanda was characterized as
“non-international,”21 the international community acted through the
Security Council’s formation of an international tribunal to prosecute
crimes that threatened international peace and security.22
Traditionally, international crimes are broadly defined as
encompassing criminal acts that threaten the international community
as a whole or acts that threaten its most fundamental values; in
comparison, transnational crimes are more limited in scope,
encompassing only crimes that take place across borders.
B. The Nature of Transnational Crimes
In contrast to the definition of international crimes, the
criminalization of conduct classified as transnational crimes emerges
from the concerns of individual states regarding their “political,
social and economic interests” and “assertions about the harm caused
to these interests.”23 For instance, money laundering is seen as a
crime that erodes financial institutions, depresses economic growth,
facilitates corruption, and increases economic instability,24 while
drug trafficking threatens public safety, economic productivity,
public health, professional advancement and education, and public
institutions.25
21. For a discussion of what constitutes a non-international conflict, see L.J. VAN DEN HERIK, THE
CONTRIBUTION OF THE RWANDA TRIBUNAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 214–215
(2005).
22. The Security Council’s language establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) expressed that “the reports indicat[ed] that genocide and other systematic, widespread and
flagrant violations of international humanitarian law” were committed in Rwanda, and the Security
Council determined that such situations “constitute a threat to international peace and security.”
Resolution 1674, which established the ICTR, emphasized that all governments have a “responsibility to
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleaning and crimes against humanity,” that the
deliberate targeting of civilians, and the commission of violations of international humanitarian law and
human rights in situations of conflict may constitute a threat to international peace and security, and that
the Security Council would act appropriately. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006).
23. Neil Boister, ‘Transnational Criminal Law’?, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 953, 957 (2003).
24. BRENT L. BARTLETT, THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF MONEY LAUNDERING ON ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 3 (2002), available at http://www.adb.org/documents/others/ogc-toolkits/anti-moneylaundering/documents/money_laundering_neg_effects.pdf.
25. See Zarina Othman, Myanmar, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Security Implications, 65
AKADEMIKA 27, 31 (2004), available at http://pkukmweb.ukm.my/~penerbit/jurnal_pdf/akad65_02.pdf
(discussing how drug trafficking threatens the civil society).
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The effect that transborder crimes could have on international
peace and security is an indirect and collateral result of the crime.
Moreover, any of these effects would depend not only on the
commission of an illegal act per se (as it is for international crimes),
but also on how extensive, violent, and damaging that illegal conduct
is on states’ interests. Such is the case with drug trafficking in
Colombia over the last two decades and more recently in Mexico.26
Drug trafficking alone was not considered a threat to the peace and
security in both nations until sophisticated weapons use sharply
escalated, huge earnings by criminal organizations armed with
professional accountants, attorneys, chemists, and intelligence agents
amassed, and political instability resulting from mass killings
drastically increased.27 Drug trafficking presented a risk to peace and
security not only because of the commission of the conduct (drug
trafficking), but also due to the type and amount of violence caused
by the drug cartels, the sizeable geographic area affected by the drug
violence, and the significant damage the violence caused in both
nations. This second step of determining if a transnational crime
threatens peace and security takes us to mixed views and conclusions.
Nations, lawyers, analysts, and scholars could see a threat, while
many others would disagree.28
Transnational crimes apply a limited extraterritorial jurisdiction.29
To exercise this jurisdiction, there is regard for where the crime is
committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the
nationality of the victim, and/or whether the crime threatens a state’s
national security; if any or all of these are met, the authority to punish
26. In Mexico alone, drug violence has claimed more than 7,000 lives since January 2007. See 60
Minutes: Mexico’s Drug War (CBS television broadcast Mar. 4, 2009), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=4836946n.
27. See generally Max Manwaring, National Security Implications of Drug Trafficking for the USA
and Columbia, SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES, 5:3:379–408 (1994).
28. In Southeast Asia, Myanmar is the main producer of illegal drugs in the region. Its closest
geographic neighbor, Thailand, declared illicit drug trafficking the number one threat to its national
security, and Malaysia and Singapore implemented mandatory penalties for drug traffickers. Myanmar
“has never admitted that illicit drugs are a threat to its national security.” Othman, supra note 25, at 33–
35.
29. The United States approaches jurisdiction for terrorists on an extraterritorial basis. See Roman
Boed, United States Legislative Approach to Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Connection with Terrorism,
2 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 145, 145–77 (2002).
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such crimes emerges under domestic law. However, extraterritorial
jurisdiction is seen as an encroachment upon the sovereignty of
nations; hence, this jurisdiction will come about only through the
cooperation of nations willing to work together.
With regard to extraterritorial jurisdiction for transnational crimes,
jurisdiction seems to be limited to when there is an injury caused or
threatened on a specific nation claiming jurisdiction. Transnational
crimes address private injuries, while international crimes focus on
international injury and injury to the international community as a
whole. So, when we seek to obtain jurisdiction for transnational
crimes, it seems that states ought to establish a link between the
crime and the state in order to exercise that territorial jurisdiction. In
contrast, with international crimes, there is no need for that specific
link. In transnational crimes, we must respect the sovereignty of the
state where harm is caused upon the private state and not on the
community as a whole. We must look at the type of crime that is
committed in order to justify extraterritorial jurisdiction. In other
words, we need to emphasize that international crime threatens
international values and harms international order, while
transnational crimes only affect individual states. In addition, unlike
in international crimes, the interests imperiled by transnational
crimes, and the possible effects that such crimes may have on peace
and security, do not justify a legitimate intrusion on nations’
sovereignty.
II. DEFINING TERRORISM
There is no international consensus as to what constitutes a
terrorist act30 or what “terrorist acts” concern the international
30. There are numerous documents and databases with lists of terrorists’ incidents. Yet, there is no
uniformity in the methodology used to determine if an act was/is terrorism or some other form of
political violence. For instance, the United States includes an incident as terrorist if it “was
premeditated; perpetrated by a subnational or clandestine agent; politically motivated, potentially
including religious, philosophical, or culturally symbolic motivations; violent; and perpetrated against a
noncombatant target.” It is international if the incident involves citizens or territory of more than one
country. See NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., A CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM FOR 2004 vii–viii, http://www.hanford.gov/oci/maindocs/ocihome_docs/NCTC_Report.pdf
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community and violate human rights in a way that shocks the
conscience of humanity. Will the bombing of a runway at an airport
in Colombia or the detonation of a 200-kilogram car bomb near a
bullring in Medellin qualify as terrorists’ acts? Will bombings of the
Guardian Civil police barracks in Barcelona, Spain by the Basque
separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) qualify, or will an
armed attack of an Indonesian village by illegally armed groups?31
Will the restaurant bombing in Spain that killed eighteen U.S.
servicemen and injured eighty-three people32 or the 1995 bombing of
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City qualify?
Lack of agreement as to what constitutes terrorism is demonstrated
by the failure of numerous nations to ratify many terrorist
conventions,33 by the diverse definitions of terrorism that exist,34 by
the wide gap in these different definitions,35 and by the continuing
disagreement over whether certain conducts can be construed as
terrorist acts.36
(last visited Mar. 6, 2009). Comparing the information offered, one can see that some
documents/databases contain incidents that others ignore. For instance, a search on the Worldwide
Incidents Tracking System webpage for Colombia shows a total of 2,293 incidents between 2004 and
2008. http://wits.nctc.gov/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2009). One excellent resource to consult in trying to
understand the definitions of terrorism is BEN SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Oxford University Press 2006).
31. Looking at several and diverse lists of terrorists’ acts worldwide, one can see how many acts are
labeled as terrorist that perhaps should not be. See William Robert Johnston, Selected Terrorist Incidents
Worldwide,
Through
September
2000,
JOHNSTON’S
ARCHIVE,
Aug.
21,
2006,
http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/wrjp255b.html; see also Tripatlas, List of Terrorist Incidents,
http://tripatlas.com/Terrorist_attack (last visited Mar. 6, 2009).
32. The restaurant was near a U.S. Air Force Base in Torrejon, Spain. The attack occurred April 12,
1984. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SIGNIFICANT TERRORISTS INCIDENTS, 1961-2003: A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY
(2004), available at http://fas.org/irp/threat/terror_chron.html.
33. There are at least twelve conventions covering acts associated with terrorism. For the text and
status
of
these
conventions,
see
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/DB.aspx?path=DB/studies/
page2_en.xml&menu=MTDSG.
34. See Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in
International Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation, 29 B. C. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 23 (2006) (for a detailed list of the many definitions of terrorism).
35. The OAS Convention only refers to the crimes against internationally protected persons. The
Islamic Convention includes certain intents as an element of the crime, while the OAS Convention does
not. See INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE UNITED NATIONS AND
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM 37 (Giuseppe Nesi ed., Ashgate 2006).
36. Such as acts of self-determination: “Peoples’ struggle including armed struggle against foreign
occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in
accordance with the principles of international law shall not be considered as a terrorism crime.”
Organization of the Islamic Conference, July 1, 1999, Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic
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It has been said, “One country’s terrorist is another’s freedom
fighter,” and how a country views its own struggle for independence
from colonization will influence its definition of terrorism and, as we
will later see, directly affect the development and implementation of
anti-terrorism policy, which includes its immigration policy. In fact,
this struggle between acts of terrorism versus acts in furtherance of
national liberation can be considered one of the main reasons that
have precluded the development of a universal definition of
terrorism. For example, Professor Michael P. Scharf notes instances
where the motivation to develop a universal definition becomes
paramount, and one such time was post-September 11.37 There was
little doubt that the events of September 11 triggered a renewed sense
of cooperation and cohesiveness among nations, and this became the
backdrop for the United Nations General Assembly to establish a
working group to develop a “comprehensive convention on
international terrorism.”38 Even with this renewed vigor, the hope for
a universal definition of terrorism remained elusive when Malaysia,
on behalf of the fifty-six member Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC), refused to accept any definition of terrorism that
did not exclude acts of “armed struggle against foreign occupation,
aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and selfdetermination.”39 Some argued the reason why the OIC was so
vehement about including such language was “to exempt acts against
Israel over the occupied territories and acts against India over
Kashmir from the definition of terrorism, and to brand violations of
the laws of war by State military forces such as the Israel Defense
Forces as terrorist acts.”40 Again, as a result of this lack of
Conference on Combating International Terrorism, Annex to Resolution No: 59/26-P, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,LEGAL,OIC,,,3de5e6646,0.html.
37. Michael P. Scharf, Defining Terrorism as the Peacetime Equivalent of War Crimes: Problems
and Prospects, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 359, 361 (2004).
38. Id.; see also HELEN DUFFY, ‘THE WAR ON TERROR’ AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 18–25 (Cambridge 2005) (providing a detailed list of the many attempts toward a universal
definition of international terrorism from as early as the 1930s to post-September 11, 2001).
39. Scharf, supra note 37 (quoting Surya P. Subedi, The U.N. Response to International Terrorism in
the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks in America and the Problem of the Definition of Terrorism in
International Law, 4 INT’L L. F. DU DROIT INT’L 159, 163 (2002)).
40. Id. (citing Nicholas Rostow, Before and After: The Changed UN Response to Terrorism Since
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cohesiveness as to “who is a terrorist?” versus “who is a legitimate
freedom fighter?,” and with no side willing to compromise on this
issue, the goal of a universally accepted definition remains out of
reach, even today.
This lack of a universally accepted definition also directly affects
how nations implement traditional limits on the obligation to
extradite. Extradition is essential in bringing individuals to justice for
international criminal offenses, including acts of terrorism. However,
without a universally accepted definition of terrorism, the obligation
to extradite and the exceptions to extradition (i.e. the political offense
exception41) are not uniformly applied and as such are subjective and
left for the individual states to define. This lack of uniformity in
nations’ obligations to extradite for acts of terrorism has forced
nations to change how they view their obligations to extradite for
crimes considered to be political in nature. For example, the political
offense exception typically is applied as a bar to extradition if certain
requirements are met.42 However, recently many nations have sought
to remove this exception for terrorism and crimes associated with
such acts. For example, the United States refused to apply this
doctrine to members of terrorist organizations, arguing that terrorists
who indiscriminately attack civilian populations should not be
permitted to hide behind the political offense exception, even if their
crimes can be considered “committed to achieving a political
purpose.”43 In the same manner, the High Court of Ireland extradited
members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and in so doing argued
September 11th, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 475, 488 (2004)).
41. DUFFY, supra note 38, at 108–12 (containing a detailed discussion on key features of extradition
law and defines the “political offense exception” as the protection against extradition for crimes that are
considered to be political in nature).
42. See Christopher L. Blakesley, The Evisceration of the Political Offense Exception to Extradition,
15 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 109, 110–18 (1986) (offering a detailed analysis of the political offense
exception, including a discussion as to how it is applied by various nations’ judiciaries, and emphasizing
the fact that while the exception is “universally accepted” but is not universally applied); Abraham D.
Sofaer, Critical Essay, The Political Offense Exception and Terrorism, 15 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
125, 126–28 (1986) (providing a detailed historical analysis of the history of the political offense
exception).
43. Marcello Di Filippo, Terrorist Crimes and International Co-operation: Critical Remarks on the
Definition and Inclusion of Terrorism in the Category of International Crimes, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 533,
559 (2008).
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that the political offense exception cannot be used to shield crimes
against humanity and acts of terrorism.44 National Courts in Latin
America also refused to permit the political offense exception to be
used for acts considered terrorist in nature and followed the reasoning
of both the American and Irish Courts.45 Thus, without a universally
accepted definition, it is clear that when states are left to define
terrorism on their own terms we will continue to see differing
opinions as to what constitutes terrorism and how such diverging
beliefs directly affect extradition and evidence-sharing.
As one can see from the above discussion, there are different
approaches to defining terrorism, which makes deciding what
constitutes a terrorist act “more art than science.” 46 Terrorism “is a
tactic used, on many fronts, by diverse perpetrators in different
circumstances and with different aims.”47 Information is frequently
deficient and only available over time, “fact patterns may be open to
interpretation, and perpetrators’ intent is rarely clear.” 48 As such, it is
this unsettled, ambiguous and subjective meaning that evolves and
results in the proliferation of definitions.49 This struggle is also
expressed in court decisions,50 United Nations resolutions,51 and even
within domestic legislation.52
44. Id. (citing Quinlivan et. al., [2000] 3 I.R. 154 (H.Ct.) (Ir.), reprinted in THE UNITED KINGDOM’S
LEGAL RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 577 (Yonah Alexander and Edgar H. Brenner eds., 2003)).
45. Filippo, supra note 43, at 560 (offering a detailed analysis where the Supreme Court of
Venezuela and the Constitutional Court of Colombia both refused to permit perpetrators of terrorist acts
to hide behind the political offense exception because of the heinous crimes committed against
civilians).
46. Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, National Counterterrorism Center, Methodology Utilized
to Compile NCTC’s Database of Terrorist Incidents, Apr. 30, 2010, http://witsclassic.nctc.gov/Methodology.do.
47. Id.; see also RONALD C. SLYE & BETH VAN SCHAACK, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE
ESSENTIALS 185 (Kluwer 2009) (noting that to some, “[t]errorism is a concept with a colloquial
meaning.”); Jonathan R. White, Terrorism in Transition, HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AND
JUSTICE 65, 66 (Philip Reichel ed., 2005) (“[T]errorism is a political activity involving crime [that
changes] with historical circumstances and the political environment.”).
48. Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, National Counterterrorism Center, supra note 46.
49. See DUFFY, supra note 38, at 17–46 (offering an excellent compendium and in-depth analysis of
the many definitions by the League of Nations, the United Nations, and regional organizations).
50. See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 107 (2d Cir. 2003) (asserting that “confusion on the
definition of terrorism abounds,” because “terrorism is defined variously by the perpetrators’ motives,
methods, targets, and victims”).
51. According to a 1970 General Assembly resolution, armed and violent acts do not constitute
terrorism if they are committed when seeking self-determination in opposition to violently enforced
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There are essentially two steps to defining terrorism. The first step
concerns the commission of the act (terrorism, i.e. tactic) and the
second step involves determining if the goal for resorting to terrorism
was primarily to influence a government or for some other purpose.53
Here, with regards to the second step, we find great discrepancy and
disagreement. For some analysts, the extent of the psychological
impact of violence committed determines if the act is terrorism,
particularly with regard to the manner in which an act may be
portrayed in the media. Cherif Bassiouni alluded to this as far back as
1981:
The relatively limited social harm resulting from acts commonly
denominated terrorism, when compared to the social harm
caused by common crimes, indicates that this psychological
impact is more significant than the acts of violence committed
and that this impact may be more media-created than intrinsic to
the acts. The role of the media likewise would explain in part the
terrorist’s choice of target and the manner of affecting the act;
the terrorist tailors both to insure media dissemination of both the
act and an underlying message to achieve terror-inspiring
effect.54

Even if both criminals and terrorists use violence as a means to
obtain a specific end, their motivation and the reach of the effects
caused are dissimilar. The criminals’ primary and direct motivation is
egocentric and personal and is often a matter of obtaining or
occupation. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, at 21, U.N.
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Oct. 24, 1970).
52. See GREGORY E. MAGGS, TERRORISM AND THE LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (West, 2005)
(noting Nicholas J. Perry’s findings of “twenty-two different definitions of terrorism in [U.S.] federal
law alone”).
53. According to the United States, it is politically motivated and against noncombatants. See
NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, NCTC FACT SHEET AND OBSERVATIONS RELATED TO 2005
TERRORIST
INCIDENTS
4
(2005),
available
at
http://wits.nctc.gov/reports/
nctcfactsheetandpressslides_2005.pdf.
54. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Terrorism, Law Enforcement, and the Mass Media: Perspectives,
Problems, Proposals, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 (1981).
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protecting material gain. Conversely, the terrorists’ primary and
direct aim is political or ideological and intended to influence public
opinion and eventually change “the system.”55 Many terrorist acts are
within one nation’s borders, and the psychological fear and primary
effects are limited. Some incidents reported as terrorist in nature,
while highly violent, are more criminal in intent than terrorist, and
this leads to some confusion over the primary and direct motivation
of the group using violent acts.56 The war-like acts of Pablo Escobar,
for example, terrorized the people of Colombia and had the character
of immediate mass destruction. Yet, it was not terrorism per se,
because the immediate aim of Pablo Escobar was not to terrorize for
political reasons or convictions, but to protect himself and preserve
his wealth.57
Terrorism is a personalizing and direct crime. Terrorists target
individuals, groups, and property in ways that yield the most farreaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate target.
This is precisely why Timothy McVeigh targeted the Murrah Federal
Building, why Colombian guerrillas bombed an athletic club crowded
with Bogotá’s social elites, and why terrorists in Mumbai targeted a
well-known and historic hotel serving international business
travelers. There is a difference between transnational crimes (drug
trafficking and money laundering) and terrorism, however, and it is
rooted in the primary goal individuals have for committing a specific
crime. In transnational crimes, the motivation is personal
aggrandizement, while the terrorist act is fundamentally altruistic.58
“A terrorist without a cause is not a terrorist.”59

55. BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 37 (2006).
56. The violence used by Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar was primarily to defend his wealth and
desire to remain in Colombia. Some analysts also claim that the FARC is nothing more than a criminal
group using violent tactics to hold onto its vast wealth acquired through traditional criminal conduct and
that any political ideology or goals the group may have once had were abandoned long ago.
57. See HOFFMAN, supra note 55, at 35–37.
58. Id. at 37 (“The terrorist is fundamentally an altruist; he believes that he is serving a “good” cause
designed to achieve a greater good for a wider constituency—whether real or imagined—that the
terrorist and his organization purport to represent. The criminal, by comparison, serves no cause at all,
just his own personal aggrandizement and material satisfaction.”).
59. Id. at 37–38. (statement of Konrad Kellen).
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Of greater concern to me is what I perceive as an over-reaction to
atrocious, violent acts committed worldwide by various groups. Even
if the violence created by terrorist acts is high, they do not justify
being treated as international crimes. With all the uncertainties we
have in determining what acts deserve the label of terrorism, we
should be cautious to avoid creating the specter of a world of
insecurity and war. As Helen Duffy so aptly put it, “[L]awlessness is
met with unlawfulness, unlawfulness with impunity, the long-term
implications for the rule of law, and the peace, stability and justice it
serves, will be grave.”60
For instance, a terrorist act in Colombia or in India damages that
nation’s interest. However, the terrorist act per se does not directly
and immediately threaten the peace and security of England, France,
or the United States. The criminal act of terrorism in Colombia may,
nonetheless, immediately and directly affect the peace and security of
the Latin American region. While all acts of terrorism are unjustified
and criminal, not all of these acts constitute a direct threat to
international peace and security and all mankind that justifies an
intrusion on a nation’s sovereignty. On the other hand, the U.N.
Security Council, in Resolution 1377, has declared that “acts of
international terrorism constitute one of the most serious threats to
international peace and security in the twenty-first century.”61 This
again raises the question of how we define international terrorism. Is
it transnational or international terrorism, and does the terminology
make a difference?62
The 2008 Mumbai attack in India was a terrorist assault targeting a
specific group of individuals and facilities with cultural and political
value that maximized the psychological impact of the attack.63 Yet,
the horrendous crime did not justify legal action by the international
60. Helen Duffy offers an excellent compendium and in-depth analysis of the many definitions by
the League of Nations, the United Nations, and regional organizations. See DUFFY, supra note 49, at 1.
61. G.A. Res. 4413/1377, 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/4413/1377 (Nov. 12, 2001).
62. Comments of Noelle Quenivet, Senior Lecturer, Bristol Law School, England, and noted
European expert on international criminal law and human rights.
63. The terrorist attack in Mumbai took place November 2008. For an excellent study of the Mumbai
attack, see ANGEL RABASA ET AL., THE LESSONS OF MUMBAI (2009), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP249.pdf.
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community so as to impinge upon India’s sovereignty (such as
military action by the Security Council), even if the action was
authorizing peacekeepers. The Mumbai attacks, the attacks of
September 11, and many other attacks around the world demonstrate
the transnational sources of terrorism and raise concerns over how
safe havens continue to enable terrorists to train, recruit, plan, and
execute their deeds. Nevertheless, these attacks alone do not justify a
violation of a nation’s sovereignty.
On the other hand, the commission of any international crimes, like
acts of genocide, per se constitutes a direct threat to international
peace and to the security of mankind regardless of intensity,
expansion, depth of violence, damage, and impact on a nation’s
security. The acknowledgment of the existence of such crimes
authorizes the international community, through the Security
Council, to enter into the nation regardless of that nation’s sacrosanct
sovereign rights.
Contrast this with transnational crimes, which are conducts already
criminalized by some individual states but that have an international
component, transboundary implications, and global impacts that are
internationalized, regulated, and homogenized in and emerging from
a treaty formed by several nations in order to curtail such crimes at
the international level. Prior to the existence of specific international
conventions, acts may have been prohibited in certain nations, but not
in others. Only when and after the specific convention is ratified by
member states does an obligation to prohibit the conducts specified in
the convention merge together with the obligation to cooperate. This
is the case with crimes of money laundering, drug trafficking, human
trafficking, and even terrorism. Unlike international crimes, then, that
emerge from international law, transnational crimes emerge from
treaty law. Likewise, transnational interests are not necessarily
common to all states and can vary from state to state.64

64. See Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Process and State Change: Opportunities and
Constraints 1 (Inst. For Int’l Law & Justice, Working Paper No. 2010/4, 2010), available at
http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2010-4.Shaffer.pdf (“The effects of transnational legal norm
conveyance, however, are not homogeneous across states. They vary in light of identifiable factors.”).
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III. CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORISM
Human rights, the interests of legitimately constituted
governments, states’ peaceful and political processes, and
international peace and security are just some of the interests
protected by the criminalization of terrorism.65 Even though various
events throughout history have driven the international community to
criminalize diverse expressions of terrorism66 and to disapprove of
terrorism as a human rights violation and a threat to peace and
security,67 we still do not have a universal definition of terrorism.
Without a clear, concise, and cohesive definition, how can terrorism
be elevated to an international crime? This raises two critical
questions: Regarding acts that violate basic human rights in a manner
that “shock[s] the conscience of humanity,”68 is the international
community well-settled on the interests that triggered the
consideration of terrorism as an international crime, and do violent
acts defy the “inherent values and interests of the community of
nations”69 so as to become of interest to the international community?
65. According to Ben Saul, the international community disapproves of terrorism on several grounds
beyond it being a serious human rights violation. Terrorism undermines democratic governance and
states’ peaceful political process, and threatens international peace and security. Saul affirms that even if
several United Nations’ resolutions implied that self determination movements were excluded from the
notion of terrorism, today “the international community has agreed that ‘all acts, methods and practices
of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, wherever and by whomever committed’ are both
criminal and unjustifiable.” Ben Saul, Three Reasons for Defining and Criminalizing Terrorism, EUR.
SOC’Y OF INT’L L., at 2, 10, available at http://www.esil-sedi.eu/fichiers/en/Saul_625.pdf (last visited
Mar. 4, 2009).
66. The first attempt was by the League of Nations following the 1934 assassination in France of
King Alexander of Yugoslavia by Croatian separatists. Only India ratified the 1937 Convention for the
Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. The Convention paved the way for later instruments
addressing terrorist offenses such as acts committed on-board aircraft, crimes against internationally
protected persons, hostage-taking, crimes involving maritime navigation, crimes involving nuclear
material, and financing of terrorism. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE
UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM, supra note 35,
at 37; SLYE & VAN SCHAACK, supra note 47, at 186–87.
67. For a comprehensive compilation of instruments considering terrorism as a threat to human
rights and to peace and security, see Saul, supra note 65, at 3–5.
68. Id. at 2.
69. Otto Triffterer, Security Interests of the Community of States, Basis and Justification of an
International Criminal Jurisdiction versus ‘Protection of National Security Information,’ Article 72
Rome Statute, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 53, 63 (Herwig
Roggemann & Petar Šarčević, eds., 2002).
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Moreover, are these interests generally recognized by all nations and
acknowledged and applied in a consistent fashion? As stated clearly
in the United States’ Supreme Court case of The Paquete Habana,70
through the passage of time, “what originally may have rested in
custom or comity, courtesy or concession,” eventually grew by the
“general assent of civilized nations, into a settled rule of international
law.”71 This leads to the question whether terrorism reached such a
level of customary international law so as to legitimize the claim that
it is an international crime and not a transborder crime? I think the
answer to this question is no. Conversely, one could argue that the
practices and customs of states regarding terrorism are inconsistent
and that the rules applied to terrorism are yet to be settled rules
recognized through the “general assent” of nations.
IV. DETERMINING VENUE
In determining a proper forum to prosecute acts of terrorism, one
must first understand the differences in jurisdiction for international
and transnational crimes. Universal jurisdiction is broad and rooted in
“the nature of the crime, without regard to where the crime was
committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the
nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the state
exercising such jurisdiction.”72
A. Crimes that Warrant Universal Jurisdiction
Is jurisdiction justified according to the type of threat or injury, or
the type of impact that the crime causes on the state or on the
international community? This question reveals the basis for
classifying terrorism. Those grave and heinous crimes that violate the
jus cogens and encroach upon the fundamental interests of the
70. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). For a detailed discussion, see GREGORY E. MAGGS,
TERRORISM AND THE LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 40 (West 2005).
71. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 694.
72. The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction 28, Princeton University Program in Law
and Public Affairs (2001), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/princeton.html
(discussing Principle 1).
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international community are subject to universal jurisdiction because
they injure the “interests of the international society as a whole.”73
Indeed, crimes eliciting universal repudiation share certain
elements: the crimes may be precisely defined, globally accepted as
such, and the jurisdiction for trying such crimes may reside in
international tribunals of supranational character or domestic
tribunals having universal jurisdiction.74 Crimes of genocide, crimes
against humanity, torture, war crimes, and acts of aggression
represent the kinds of criminal acts we generally accept as being
subject to the purview of international criminal tribunals such as the
ICC.75
The question is whether terrorism belongs to this category of
crimes.
Prior to the September 11 attacks, many nations raised criminal
acts to the level of terrorist acts if certain conditions were met.76
Usually terrorism was understood in a domestic context and states
were reluctant to prosecute terrorist acts that were unrelated to them.
This changed following the September 11 attacks, however, as a
flurry of legislation worldwide, specifically labeled “terrorist
legislation,” elevated crimes under ordinary law to the level of
terrorist acts if a transnational character, such as linkage to foreign or
domestic terrorist organizations, was indicated.
The United States enacted anti-terrorism legislation based on the
idea that if terrorism is an act occurring beyond U.S. borders, but of
which the United States can feel threatened, then such unlawful acts
73. Boister, supra note 23, at 963; see also Gregory S. Gordon, From Incitement to Indictment?
Prosecuting Iran’s President for Advocating Israel’s Destruction and Piecing Together Incitement
Law’s Emerging Analytical Framework, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 853, 882–84 (2008).
74. For a comprehensive study on the jurisdiction and formation of international tribunals, see
Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to
Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 901 (2005).
75. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 6. These crimes are typically characterized as being of such
extreme gravity as to be considered injurious to mankind as a whole and for which some universal duty
arises to sanction and punish.
76. In the United States, for example, criminal acts are considered terrorist when it can be shown that
the crimes perpetrated are “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents,” 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2006), or
are intended “to intimidate or coerce a civilian population” or “influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion,” 18 U.S.C. §§ 2231(B)(ii)–2331(B)(i) (2006).
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constituting terrorism in other countries are similarly unlawful in the
United States.77 Armed with such domestic legislation, the United
States will without hesitation go after any individual who it claims to
be a terrorist. Through the execution of extraterritorial measures,
including a practice known as rendition, the United States will try to
reach within the borders of another country to grab a suspect and
bring that suspect onto United States soil. However, the United States
reserves the right to prohibit other nations from doing the same
within the United States.78 This reservation again raises the specter of
imperialistic condescension and can be construed in parts of the
world as anathema to the spirit of universal and multilateral
cooperation in the fight against terrorism and crimes of universal
jurisdiction.
In Canada, terrorist legislation was added to the Criminal Code by
the Anti-Terrorism Act of December 2001.79 Similar to terrorism
legislation in the United States, the Canadian law is intended to bring
terrorism offenses under Canadian jurisdiction,80 “even if the ultimate
terrorist activity takes place entirely outside of Canada or is intended
to take place elsewhere.”81 The law defines terrorist activity as “an
act or omission that is committed in or outside of Canada” that (A) is
an offense under one of ten United Nations anti-terrorism
conventions and protocols; or (B) is (1) committed for political,
religious, or ideological purposes; and (2) is intended to threaten the
public or national security, including economic security; or to compel
a person, a government or an organization (whether located in or
outside of Canada) to do or to refrain from doing something; and (3)
77. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2006) (“[T]he term ‘terrorist activity’ means any activity
which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed [ ]or which, if it had been
committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or any State.”).
78. One is reminded of former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld delaying a trip to a conference in
Germany until indictments brought against him in France and Germany for torture in Iraq were
dismissed. See Bruce Zagaris, French Prosecutors Dismiss Torture Case Against Rumsfeld, 24 INT’L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 84 (2008).
79. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C 46 §§ 83.01–83.33 (2010); see also Debbie Johnston,
Lifting the Veil on Corporate Terrorism: The Use of the Criminal Code Terrorism Framework to Hold
Multinational Corporations Accountable for Complicity in Human Rights Violations Abroad, 66 U.
TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 137, 152 (2008).
80. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C 46 §§ 7(3.73), 7(3.74), 8.03 (2010).
81. Johnston, supra note 79, at 152.
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intentionally causes death or serious harm; endangers a person;
causes substantial property damage that is likely to seriously harm
people; or interferes with or disrupts an essential service, facility, or
system.82
We need to ask, however, whether criminal acts (answerable under
the principle of territoriality), relabeled as terrorist acts (answerable
under the principles of universality), rise to the level of crimes
subject to the universal jurisdiction of international criminal
tribunals. The Canadian and British legislative bodies were sensitive
to this distinction in the drafting of their anti-terrorist laws, which
“are grounded in the principle of universal jurisdiction,”83 by
inserting a “‘political, religious, or ideological’ motive clause . . . in
an effort to narrow the reach of an otherwise broad definition and to
distinguish it from other criminal acts aimed at intimidation.”84
B. The Use of Universal Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts
In past eras, nations were generally reluctant to cast the net of
domestic adjudication over crimes having extraterritorial character.
More recently, however, due in part to the global war against
terrorism and the globalization and breakdown of trade, economic,
and political barriers, states have enacted criminal legislation that
asserts extraterritoriality. Such a move by nations toward universal
jurisdiction represents the global coalescence of common causes,
such as responding to gross violations of human rights, including
“genocide, crimes against humanity, and trafficking of women and
children, particularly where host states lack the capacity or will to
hold perpetrators accountable.”85 According to Amnesty
International, some 125 nations have enacted criminal legislation
extending universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity and
other jus cogens crimes.86 Notable cases of domestic courts
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C 46 §§ 83.01(1)(a), 83.01(1)(b)(ii) (2010).
Johnston, supra note 79, at 143, n.18.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 146.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: THE DUTY OF STATES TO ENACT AND
IMPLEMENT LEGISLATION 3 (2001), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR53/002/2001/en/dom-
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prosecuting foreign nationals under universal jurisdiction and
extraterritoriality include Adolf Eichmann in Israel, Nikolai Jorgic in
Germany (for crimes of genocide in the former Yugoslavia),87 and
more recently Roy M. Belfast, a.k.a. Charles “Chuckie” Taylor,
convicted in the United States for acts of torture and other crimes in
Liberia.88
However, it must be noted that universal jurisdiction under
domestic legislation does not impose a duty on a State to act against
the perpetrators of extraterritorial crimes. Such legislation only
“authorizes, rather than obliges States to prosecute and punish
offenders” under international law.89
There is an inherent risk, however, in exercising universal
jurisdiction in a domestic judicial venue over international terrorist
acts. The specter of imperialism looms over the attempts by global
powers, particularly the United States, to hold the perpetrators of
terrorist acts accountable for acts that occur outside a prosecuting
State’s sovereign territory. Austen Parrish makes the point, well
taken, that the “extraterritorial application of American law certainly
has the appearance of a unilateral instrument of American
hegemony.”90 The same can be said for other superpowers using
domestic legislation to impose order on a chaotic and violent world.
From this there is a cautionary tale to be learned: Court decisions
issued forth from the world’s power brokers, especially the United
States, are often viewed by other nations as suspect. “This is
IOR530022001en.pdf (visited Apr. 4, 2009). Jus Cogens crimes include crimes of aggression, genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, piracy, slavery and slave-related practices, and torture. See M.
Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 63, 68 (1996).
87. See Gordon, supra note 68, at 883–84 (also noting the conviction of Désiré Munyaneza, tried in
Canada for genocide related to the mass murder of Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994).
88. See Roy Belfast Jr., a/k/a Chuckie Taylor, Sentenced on Torture Charges, BIOTERRORISM WEEK,
Jan. 26, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 1275299.
89. Audrey Golden, Comment, Monkey Read, Monkey Do: Why the First Amendment Should Not
Protect the Printed Speech of an International Genocide Inciter, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1149, 1159–
60 (2008) (emphasis omitted) (citing Lee A. Steven, Note, Genocide and the Duty to Extradite or
Prosecute: Why the United States is in Breach of Its International Obligations, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 425,
440 (1998–1999)).
90. Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815,
866–67 (2009).
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particularly true when the United States applies a double standard—
permitting foreigners to be sued in U.S. courts, but not permitting
human rights lawsuits to be filed against American actors.”91 If such
is the case, Parrish concludes, then “vigorous enforcement of human
rights through international instruments and institutions”92—in other
words international tribunals and sanctions by the United Nations or
other international bodies—would seem the proper avenue for
adjudicating criminal acts that fall under the mantel of universal
jurisdiction.
C. Universal Jurisdiction in International Tribunals
With regards to terrorism, there are several pitfalls to lifting it to
the level of tribunals having universal jurisdiction, such as the
International Criminal Court. For one thing, doing so would be
difficult because the crimes that are included in the ICC are jus
cogens crimes, considered so awful as to shock the conscience of the
world and to be an affront to all human beings. If we adhere to this
standard, then terrorism does not necessarily meet the criteria of the
ICC if one considers that terrorism is a very politicized and
contradictory concept subject to interpretation—“One man’s terrorist
is another man’s freedom fighter.”93 If such were the case then acts
considered heroic in different epochs of United States history could
be subject to universal jurisdiction, such as the pacification of the
Indians of the American Plains in the later nineteenth century. Also,
we may not wish to revisit the many accounts of atrocities carried out
in the Philippines by United States military commanders during the
Filipino-American War of 1899–1902, in which some 1.4 million
Filipinos died under what by today’s standards would be considered
state-sponsored jus cogens crimes against humanity. The same
analogy might be drawn to crimes of aggression, which will never be
91. Id. at 867.
92. Id.
93. A widely used aphorism attributed by some to former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark and
by others to Irish revolutionary and early Sinn Fein leader Michael Collins who is thought to have said,
“One man’s terrorist is another man’s revolutionary.” The Clark-attributed phrase is actually found in
Gerald Seymour’s 1975 novel, HARRY’S GAME: A THRILLER 62 (Overlook TP 2007) (1975).
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part of the ICC because we don’t have universal agreement as to the
definition. For example, prior to September 11, the acts of the FARC
guerrillas were considered common crimes. However, postSeptember 11, the FARC guerrillas became terrorists committing the
same crimes.94
International crimes are domestic crimes internationalized by
treaty or convention. Crimes are made international in scope by the
international community in reaction to the heinous gravity of the
criminal conduct. However, they do not become crimes just by
customary international law; they become international crimes by the
shock and repugnance that the actions provoke in the global
community as a whole. Whereas transnational criminal law becomes
an obligation through domestic legislation,95 international criminal
law imposes obligations regardless of domestic legislation.
Transnational criminal law does not create individual criminal
responsibility under international law but does so under domestic
law. The authority to punish emerges from domestic law. On the
other hand, international criminal law creates individual criminal
responsibility under international law regardless of whether or not
individual nations criminalized such conduct under its domestic law.
The authority to punish international crimes arises from international
law because these crimes are codified under customary international
law, which is the product of international consensus. Therefore, the
prohibition of this crime is independent of the existence of a treaty.
When comparing perpetrators of international crimes with those
who commit transnational crimes, a characteristic emerges that can
determine if national criminal jurisdiction or another jurisdiction is
the more appropriate forum for prosecuting terrorist acts.
94. It is noteworthy that the conflict between the United States and Colombia over prosecuting the
war against terrorism, currently, is that President Alvaro Uribe began extraditing FARC members under
the label narcotraffickers rather than trying them in Colombia under the label of terrorist. This presents a
significant problem in international criminal justice. However, in 2004, Juvenal Palmera Pineda, a.k.a.
Simón Trinidad, a FARC commander, was extradited to the United States under a terrorism indictment
related to the taking of American hostages in Colombia in 2003. Press Release, High-Ranking Member
of Colombian FARC Narco-Terrorist Organization Extradited to U.S. on Terrorism, Drug Charges (Dec.
31, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/December/04_crm_808.htm.
95. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2006) (defining terrorist activities and terrorist
organizations under United States law).
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International crimes are often linked to individuals occupying
positions of power96 who commit those crimes out of or in relation to
that position, or who have the appearance of power within a
particular nation and frequently claim to have acted to protect
national security or the nation’s interest.97 In such cases, one must
ask if domestic jurisdiction preserves a sufficient guarantee to protect
the values inherent to the international community and prevent
further violations without the aid of other nations or that of
supranational jurisdictions. In contrast, individuals accused of
transnational crimes are generally not motivated to commit such acts
out of or in relation to their position of power or to protect the
nation’s interest or national security. Rather, the motives of those
committing transnational crimes more often include greed, hatred,
ambition, and other personal objectives.
V. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION FOR DOMESTIC TERRORISM
If acts of international terrorism become subject to international
tribunals, then where do domestic terrorist acts fall? If a state is
unable to respond to domestic terrorism, would not the enormity or
wantonness of a domestic terrorist act subject its perpetrators to the
universal jurisdiction and trial before an international tribunal? For
instance, terrorist acts carried out by such groups as the ETA in
Spain, the IRA in Northern Ireland, the Tamil guerrillas in Sri Lanka,
and the FARC and Ejercito de Liberacion (ELN) in Colombia do not
target individuals because of nationality. Rather, they target
individuals because of the impact such indiscriminate and wanton
violence will have on the state. Terrorists who cause mayhem within
96. Sometimes those accused of having committed the crimes in the name of and for the nation are
not actually running the country.
97. Under Article 6(1)(a) & (b) of the ICC, crimes of genocide “do not necessarily presuppose an
abuse of power, but quite often have this basis.” The definitions in (c) and (e) show “that position of
power and its abuse appear there as a typical and sometimes as an indispensable condition.” Under
Article 7(1) and (2)(a), in crimes against humanity, “a power position and its abuse based on the context
with activities of a greater unit is presupposed for every single one of these crimes.” The war crimes
listed in Article 8 “presuppose already by their definitions a certain position of power and its abuse, or at
least a relationship to such a position.” Triffterer, supra note 12, at 65–66.
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their national borders still commit terrorism per se that is universally
recognized for what it is; they terrorize civilians and government
targets in order to compel the state to act in conformance with their
objectives.
VI. OTHER MECHANISMS FOR COMBATING TERRORISM
A. Institutionalization of States of Emergency
In the post-2001 world, there has been a trend toward the
institutionalization of states of emergency in the United States and
other nations.98 For some nations, the move to strengthen the rule of
law through executive fiat represents an honest effort to reinforce and
restore the rule of law in weak and failing states, while in other
nations, such as Venezuela and Colombia, the institutionalization of
states of emergency seems little more than an effort to cloak
totalitarian tendencies in the guise of cooperating with other states to
fight both domestic and international terrorism. It appears, especially
in the aftermath of September 11, that more nations are imposing
state-of-emergency situations in order to implement forms of
legislation that may be construed as oppressive and that curtail or
threaten to curtail human rights. One might consider that there has
emerged a correlation made between pre-September 11 conditions
when nations were criticized, even by the United States, for
legislating repressive criminal sanctions, and post-September 11
conditions when states were praised for promulgating such legislation
in the name of being strong on terrorism. Some of the nations brought
to mind include Colombia, India, China, Chile, and Israel.
Following September 11, a host of nations declared states of
emergency. While some used such measures as a consequence to
implementing terrorist-specific legislation, one could suggest that for
a few nations, invoking a state of emergency was little more than a
pretext for oppressive regimes to exert themselves, particularly by
labeling groups as terrorists that would otherwise have been nothing
98. Norberg, supra note 1 at 30.
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more than dissident groups. Chile is a current case in point. There,
the government is using its Anti-Terrorist Law,99 first enacted during
the Pinochet dictatorship, to suppress a long-running indigenous
Mapuche autonomy movement. Miguel Tapia Huenulef, the first
Mapuche dissident to be tried under the law, was charged in February
2009 with arson on a private estate and for an alleged attack on a
public defender’s office.100 In announcing the charges, Chile’s
Interior Minister stressed that the alleged acts show all the hallmarks
of terrorism and warrant invoking the Anti-Terrorist Law. The
Observatory on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, a human rights
organization monitoring the developments in Chile, countered that
the Anti-Terrorist Law was being applied inappropriately. “The
Mapuche people’s struggle in support of their demands is not an act
of terrorism . . . . ‘In actual fact, there is no organization for the
purpose of sowing fear among the population, there is no
organization that would commit those crimes defined in law as
terrorist crimes.’”101 This is a clear example of how the lack of a clear
and cohesive definition contributes to the misapplication of antiterrorist legislation.
B. Immigration Law and Policy to Fight Terrorism
Terrorism has been fought with tools of law enforcement,
legislative acts, and executive fiat of rule by decree. Added to the
arsenal of fighting terrorism is the application of a more innocuous
weapon: immigration law and procedures to control terrorism on
domestic soil and to prevent suspected terrorists from going
elsewhere to commit terrorist acts.102 Many nations have used police
99. Law No. 18314, Mayo 16, 1984, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), amended by Law No. 19241,
Agosto 28, 1993, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), available at http://www.leychile.cl/
Navegar?idNorma=29731&buscar=Ley+18314 (determining terroristic acts and establishing the
penalties).
100. See Pamela Sepúlveda, Chile: Indigenous Activist Arrested Under Anti-Terrorist Law,
INTERPRESS SERV., Feb. 24, 2009, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/crime-law-enforcementcorrections/law-arrests/12699360-1.html.
101. Id. (quoting Rodolfo Valdivia, co-director of the Observatory on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (ODPI)).
102. According to Michael J. Garcia, head of U.S. Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), immigration law is “an incredibly important piece of the terrorism response.” Mary
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forces to locate and arrest suspected or perceived terrorists, and they
have used their domestic courts to prosecute them. It is true that to
some extent, there is greater vigilance at points of entry; although,
one may argue that international borders are more porous than in the
past.
In the aftermath of September 11, several nations discovered that
existing immigration laws were not enforced and that the laws
contained several loopholes that could compromise a state’s ability to
secure its territory from illegal entries by terrorists. The
vulnerabilities discovered in immigration practices led to radical
shifts in nations’ anti-terrorism policies.103 For example, in partial
response to the breakdown in immigration enforcement in the United
States that contributed to the September 11 attacks, extensive
measures were undertaken in many nations to identify weaknesses in
the laws that allowed some of the terrorists to go about their business
largely unnoticed on foreign soil.104
For instance, in the United States, prior to September 11, the
United States Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) failed
on many occasions to register and track aliens as required by law.
This kept the government in the dark as to when aliens entered the
United States and when they exited the country.105 Such a “lack of

Beth Sheridan, Immigration Law as Anti-Terrorism Tool, THE WASH. POST, June 13, 2005, at A01,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/12/
AR2005061201441.html.
103. For a comprehensive description of the European Union response, see Evelien Brouwer,
Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism: A Changing Dynamic Legal and Practical Development in the EU
in Response to the Terrorist Attacks of 11.09, 4 EUR. J. MIGRATION L. 399 (2003).
104. FRANCIS T. MIKO & CHRISTIAN FROEHLICH, GERMANY’S ROLE IN FIGHTING TERRORISM:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY, 4 (2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32710.pdf.
105. After 9/11, the Justice Department began the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System,
or NSEERS, to close such loopholes. War on Terrorism: Immigration Enforcement Since September 11,
2001: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 2 (2003), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/
judiciary/hju86954.000/hju86954_0f.htm. (“Since the implementation of NSEERS in September 2002,
more than 138,000 aliens from over 151 countries have been registered. NSEERS has resulted in the
identification of 11 aliens linked to terrorism, the arrests of more than 120 criminal aliens and the
issuance of more than 12,000 charging documents placing deportable aliens in deportation proceedings.
This program is now run in DHS.”).
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enforcement was dangerous and ripe for abuse by aliens wishing to
stay below the radar, including terrorists.”106
The horrific train bombings in Madrid, Spain, on March 11, 2004,
were perpetrated by Moroccan immigrants. Three years earlier, in
November 2001, two of the perpetrators had been named in a report
as members of an al Qaeda cell, which had suspected links to a group
that later carried out several bombings in Casablanca in 2003; another
terrorist in the Madrid attacks was linked to a group that deployed
several suicide bombers throughout Morocco, also in 2003.107
The fact that all of the terrorist hijackers who attacked the United
States on September 11 were aliens does not, of course, make all
aliens terrorists. But it does, however, reveal that those terrorists
exploited existing weaknesses in immigration laws and procedures,108
and demonstrates an urgent need for changes in and implementation
of U.S. immigration policy.
Some observers suggest that terrorism has been fought largely with
immigration law109 and that doing so stigmatizes innocent individuals
caught up in the war on terrorism.110 Yet, one must acknowledge that
immigration policies are key ingredients in the efforts to combat
terrorism. Further, one must acknowledge that such policies are
effective if the implementation of the policies is evenhanded, if the
laws are carefully crafted to avoid further erosion of civil liberties, if
106. Id. (statement of Hon. John Hostettler, Chairman, Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec. &
Claims, Committee on the Judiciary)
107. See David Ing, Moroccan Islamist Group Linked to Madrid Bombs, JANE’S INTELLIGENCE REV.,
Apr. 2004, at 4. One of the individuals had been living in Spain since 1985, another since 1996, and yet
another had moved to Spain in 1999. Tim Golden & Craig S. Smith, Spain Arrests 5 More Suspects in
Madrid Bomb Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2004, at A12.
108. Five of the 9/11 hijackers had clear immigration violations and one had a possible violation.
THOMAS R. ELDRIDGE, SUSAN GINSBURG, WALTER T. HEMPEL II, JANICE L. KEPHART & KELLY
MOORE, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 9/11 AND
TERRORIST TRAVEL 147 (2004), available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/
911_TerrTrav_Monograph.pdf.
109. Naomi Norberg, Terrorism and International Criminal Justice: Dim Prospects for a Future
Together, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 11, 33–34 (2010).
110. For example, “Ali Alubeidy was caught up in an investigation of fraudulent Pennsylvania
commercial driver’s licenses. It wasn’t until after the attacks on New York and the Pentagon that the
FBI pursued his case as having a possible link to terrorism. Although the connection soon unraveled,
Alubeidy, an Iraqi immigrant, lives with the stigma.” Mary Beth Sheridan, Immigration Law as AntiTerrorism Tool, WASH. POST, June 13, 2005, at A01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/06/12/AR2005061201441.html (visited Apr. 18, 2009).
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detentions solely based on someone looking “Arab or Middle Eastern
or Latino or other” are avoided,111 and if implementation avoids
generalization and the amalgam between Islam immigrants and
terrorism.112
In order to be effective, immigration laws must balance the need of
protecting the security of nations with the needs of the immigrant
population. States must be aware that immigrants are “person[s] with
identities, with cultural and religious backgrounds, with aspirations,
with all the complexities” that cannot be disregarded out of hand.113
Immigrants go through “tremendous change in their lives.”114 They
must adapt to new cultures and new realities while often receiving
contradictory signals as to their acceptance by the communities in
which they have settled.115 At the same time, external forces, such as
the sweeping momentum of globalization, generate tensions that
impact the capacity of immigrants to be integrated into new
surroundings.116 Integration favors the haves and exclusion awaits the
have-nots. Meanwhile, immigrants also face the mega-trend of
standardization through the media, the pressure of consumption
patterns, and a youth culture of intolerance that foments violent
reactions from disaffected and marginalized members of the
immigrant community toward the established order, be it of national
or international character.117
Immigration policy changes alone cannot prevent terrorism, but
perhaps are a viable “soft” alternative to employing the use of force,
potentially trampling on human rights. Even if immigration laws do
not explicitly incorporate anti-terrorism measures, “immigration laws
can provide a quick, easy way to detain people who could be
111. War on Terrorism: Immigration Enforcement Since September 11, 2001: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 6
(2003).
112. Bensalah Alaoui, Remarks at the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security:
Immigration:
Is
Integration
Failing?
(Mar.
9,
2005)
(transcript
available
at
http://summit.clubmadrid.org/keynotes/immigration-is-integration-failing.html).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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planning attacks,”118 and at the very least, can be used to detain and
deport individuals suspected of being terrorists or supporters of
terrorist groups who have overstayed their visa limits.119
Yet, because immigration law is primarily intended to regulate
those seeking to migrate to another country, it is very difficult to
ensure that innocent individuals will not be unjustly caught up in the
application of immigration law and procedures to combat terrorists.
Indeed, one cannot deny that in the War on Terror, immigrants
constitute an invisible casualty.120 Based on research of “more than
212 known terrorists in North America and Europe,” the Nixon
Center concluded that even though “most immigrants are not
terrorists, most terrorists are immigrants.”121 Those findings explain
why numerous immigrants have come under scrutiny in national
security investigations.
Standards of practice vary from nation to nation. In Germany, the
government has decided that profiling is an acceptable means for
identifying likely terrorists.122 In contrast, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) in the United States asserts that it does not
focus on any particular ethnic or religious group, but does target
individuals who, according to DHS investigations, are or may be
involved in activities damaging to national security.123 Reporting
Justice Department activities with regard to DHS prosecutions of
118. Sheridan, supra note 110, at A01.
119. Id.
120. Sean Garcia, Immigration Reform Key to Border Security 7 (Americas Program,
Interhemispheric Resource Center 2003) (referring to the hundreds of migrants who either die trying to
enter the United States or work on all kinds of jobs once in the United States).
121. Robert S. Leiken, Bearers of Global Jihad? Immigration and National Security after 9/11, at 14
(The Nixon Center 2004). The Center surveyed “212 individuals arrested or killed from 1993 to 2003 in
North America or Western Europe for their links to Al Qaeda.” Id. In footnote 1, the Center refers to a
study done by the Center for Immigration Studies by Steven Camarota, The Open Door: How Militant
Islamic Terrorists Entered and Remained in the United States 1993-2001, which studied forty-eight
terrorists detained before September 11, including the nineteen hijackers.
122. In Germany, the Muslim population has influenced that nation’s antiterrorism legislation, and
profiling is considered an acceptable means for identifying likely terrorists. However, the “police are
prohibited from collecting intelligence and can only begin an investigation when there is probable cause
that a crime has been committed.” FRANCIS T. MIKO & CHRISTIAN FROEHLICH, GERMANY’S ROLE IN
FIGHTING TERRORISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY, 5–10 (2004), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32710.pdf.
123. Sheridan, supra note 110, at A01.
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individuals suspected of having ties to terrorist groups, Washington
Post reporter Mary Beth Sheridan noted,
Homeland Security agents do detain people from lots of different
countries on immigration charges; but they succeed in arresting
only a small percentage of the illegal population . . . . They
clearly have focused more on looking at people who they
consider possible national-security threats. Many Muslims and
Arab-Americans feel they’re being hit with charges very few
others face. They’re true in some cases. The issue there is
whether they’ve violated the immigration law, and whether
there’s reason to scrutinize them. The government argues it’s not
profiling but checking out information it receives that links the
individuals to some kind of threat.124

The events of September 11 also triggered in some nations the fear
that suspects already living within their borders would be able to take
advantage of the laws in place, such as petitioning for political
asylum, extending residency permits, and capitalizing on guest
worker and professional training programs. An example of the latter
would be the ability of foreign students to remain in the United States
following completion of their studies in the capacity of a trainee in a
professional field related to their studies under the terms of their F-1
or M-1 visas.125 A number of governments also question whether
terrorists may have married in order to obtain citizenship and view
certain second-generation immigrants with citizenship as a potential
recruitment pool for terrorism.126 This is a particularly thorny issue
for European states, where, for example, 93% of all Algerian
immigrants settle in France, creating a condition of mass migration

124. Dan Eggen & Mary Beth Sheridan, Justice Department: Terror Trials and Tribulations: Live
Q&A Transcript, WASH. POST.COM, June 13, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/discussion/2005/06/10/DI2005061001426.html.
125. See U.S. Department of State, Student Visas, http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/
types_1268.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
126. In Germany, this happens mainly with the Muslim community. MIKO & FROEHLICH, supra note
122, at 7–8.
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known as “channeling.”127 Under such a condition, entire populations
relocate to a receiving nation, and with that comes insulated networks
for smuggling, moving money around outside the formal economy,
and creating and sustaining conditions for terrorists and terrorist
networks to thrive. Coupled with the isolation and lower-class status
in European societies that most immigrants experience, the secondand even third-generation offspring grow up with deep resentment
and distrust of the nations in which they have been raised but for
which they have little attachment or affinity.
So, even if immigration laws are enforced, the loopholes and
problems with monitoring the status of legal immigrations and the
conditions created by marginalization and isolation do nothing to
insulate or shield a nation from potential terrorists, since the terrorists
may have already legalized their status as resident aliens allowing
them to live within the borders of states they hate and want to
destroy. Besides, one might suggest that deporting all illegal aliens
would likely still not relieve a nation of potential terrorists.
In the United States, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) approach has resulted in very few terrorism or national security
convictions, although several individuals detained for immigration
violations have been successfully prosecuted for other crimes.128
Reporting on the actual level of success, however, is not terribly
reliable. Whereas the Justice Department, during a three-year period
of enforcement activity following the September 11 attacks, claimed
that some 200 aliens had been convicted of crimes related to
terrorism or national security, a Washington Post investigation placed
the number at 39 individuals.129 “Most of the others were convicted
of relatively minor crimes such as making false statements and
violating immigration law—and had nothing to do with terrorism.”130
The Washington Post reached a number of startling conclusions that
127. Robert S. Leiken, Europe’s Mujahideen: Where Mass Immigration Meets Global Terrorism,
CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, Apr. 2005, at 2, available at http://www.cis.org/
articles/2005/back405.pdf.
128. Eggen & Sheridan, supra note 124.
129. Dan Eggen & Julie Tate, U.S. Campaign Produces Few Convictions on Terrorism Charges,
WASH. POST, June 12, 2005, at A1.
130. Id.
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called into serious question not only the practicality of using
immigration laws to hunt down terrorists or those associating with
them but also the “truthiness” of claims proffered by the government
as to its success in fighting the War on Terror on home turf:
Taken as a whole, the data indicate that the government’s
effort to identify terrorists in the United States has been less
successful than authorities have often suggested. The statistics
provide little support for the contention that authorities have
discovered and prosecuted hundreds of terrorists here. Except for
a small number of well-known cases—such as truck driver
Iyman Faris, who sought to take down the Brooklyn Bridge—
few of those arrested appear to have been involved in active plots
inside the United States.
Among all the people charged as a result of terrorism probes
in the three years after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, The Post
found no demonstrated connection to terrorism or terrorist
groups for 180 of them.
Just one in nine individuals on the list had an alleged
connection to the al Qaeda terrorist network and only 14 people
convicted of terrorism-related crimes—including Faris and
convicted Sept. 11 plotter Zacarias Moussaoui—have clear links
to the group. Many more cases involve Colombian drug cartels,
supporters of the Palestinian cause, Rwandan war criminals or
others with no apparent ties to al Qaeda or its leader, Osama bin
Laden.131

In order to differentiate real threats from perceived threats, nations
need to review their immigration policies and implement
comprehensive changes, considering in the process their duty to
protect the rights of immigrants and refugees from government abuse
and harassment. Immigration policies at the most fundamental level
are little more than a checkpoint to (1) facilitate the entry of

131. Id. at A1, A18.
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foreigners whose presence is desired and (2) identify and deter the
entry of foreigners who are not so desirable.
Carefully drafted policies should help discourage future domestic
terrorist attacks without damaging other values inherent in nations
who adhere to the rule of law and aspire to the best aspects of a civil
society. Such policies should also address methods of continually
monitoring, evaluating, and then improving the processing and
issuing of visas, curbing unauthorized entries, and increasing
enforcement in a fair and reliable manner. However, the immigrationterrorism link, reinforced by post-2001 Security Council Resolutions,
appears to conflict with such sentiments, condones conflict between
the two components of law and government, and stands in sharp
contrast to the world’s response to the core crimes. Therefore, there is
a serious question as to whether the ICC should have jurisdiction
over terrorism, because doing so would not only condone but also
exacerbate the efforts to strike a balance between immigration policy
and fighting terrorism.
Prior to the attacks of September 11, terrorism was fought with
tools of law enforcement rather than with administrative processes
such as immigration law and procedure. Many nations have used
police forces to locate and arrest suspected or perceived terrorists,
and they have used their domestic courts to try them. It is true that to
some extent there is greater vigilance at points of entry, although one
may argue that international borders are now more porous than in the
past.
After September 11, the trend seems to have become one in which
nations are trying to look more carefully at who is violating
immigration laws that have already been established, as a further
weapon in a state’s counter-terrorism arsenal. For instance, prior to
September 11, with the exception of the attack at the 1972 Munich
Olympics on Israeli athletes by the Palestinian Black September
Movement,132 Germany’s experience combating terrorism was
132. For a brief background of the events and actors involved in the Munich tragedy, see
Wikipedia.com, Munich Massacre, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Munich_massacre (last visited Apr. 18,
2009).
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predominantly focused on domestic actors such as the Red Army
Faction and its derivatives.133 But Germany received a wake-up call
when it realized that the 9/11 terrorists hatched their plot on German
soil over the course of several years, largely by taking advantage of
Germany’s liberal asylum policies and the low levels of surveillance
by authorities.134 In response to what had occurred under Germany’s
watch, the government took extensive domestic measures to identify
weaknesses in their laws, which had allowed some of the terrorists to
live and plot in Germany largely unnoticed. In revising its antiterrorism policies, Germany was careful to ensure that its internal and
international actions would remain consistent with its own domestic
laws:
In its efforts to combat terrorism, Germany has emphasized the
need to ensure that all of its domestic and international actions
are consistent with the country’s own laws, values and historical
lessons of the Nazi era. Germany has given high priority to the
protection of the civil rights and liberties of all those residing in
Germany, including non-citizens. Germans stress that this longstanding emphasis on civil rights should not be seen as a lack of
political will to target terrorists today.135

In the drafting of its anti-terrorism legislation, Germany followed
Canada and Britain, and was particularly sensitive to religious and
cultural groups.
The first [of two major anti-terrorism packages that Germany
adopted] . . . targeted loopholes in German law that permitted
terrorists to live and raise money in Germany. Significant
changes included[:] (1) [t]he immunity of religious groups and
charities from investigation or surveillance by authorities was
133. For a brief background on the history and operations of the Red Army Faction, see
Wikipedia.com, Red Army Faction, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Army_Faction (last visited Apr.
18, 2009).
134. See MIKO & FROEHLICH, supra note 122, at 2.
135. Id. at 3.
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revoked, as were their special privileges under right of assembly,
allowing the government greater freedom to act against extremist
groups; (2) terrorists could now be prosecuted in Germany, even
if they belonged to foreign terrorist organizations acting only
abroad; (3) the ability of terrorists to enter and reside in Germany
was curtailed; and [(]4) border and air traffic security were
strengthened.136

Moreover, in conjunction with reforming its immigration laws,
Germany also took the added step to strengthen its ability to resist
and combat terrorism by improving the effectiveness and
communication of intelligence and law enforcement agencies at the
federal and state levels. “The new laws provided the German
intelligence and law enforcement agencies greater latitude to gather
and evaluate information, as well as to communicate and share
information with each other and with law enforcement authorities at
the state level.”137
VII. APPLYING UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION TO DOMESTIC TERRORISM
A. Extraditing Terrorists to Face Charges
Yet another problem for terrorism to be lifted to the status of an
international crime is the lack of cooperation among nations to
extradite those responsible. Take, for example, the case of César
Orgafas, a Colombian national, whose extradition to the United
States to answer to charges of terrorism was blocked by the Supreme
Court of Colombia. The Court reasoned that the criminal acts of
kidnapping and terrorism had not occurred in the United States but in
Colombia despite the fact that the victims were American citizens.
The Supreme Court agreed to extradite Orgafas to the United States if
he was to be only tried for narco-trafficking, specifically stating that
136. Id. at 4.
137. Id. (“Some $1.8 billion was made immediately available for new counterterrorism measures. In
fiscal years 2002 and 2003, the budget for relevant security and intelligence authorities was increased by
about $580 million.”).

Published by Reading Room, 2011

37

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 13

376

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:2

he could not be tried for the crime of kidnapping, terrorism, or giving
material support to international terrorist organizations. Such a ruling
could be construed as an indication as to how nations feel, that maybe
an act of terrorism belongs to their specific jurisdiction and not to the
jurisdiction of requesting states. The Colombian Supreme Court has
also stated that the lack of territorial jurisdiction on the part of the
United States renders Colombia the proper forum to try this or any
other similarly-charged individual because according to the Supreme
Court, the crimes of kidnapping and terrorism were initiated and
ended in Colombian territory, and the laws of kidnapping are subject
to the principle of territorial jurisdiction.
B. Gathering Evidence to Try Terrorists in International Tribunals
This example similarly illustrates the challenge of gathering
evidence in order to bring individuals accused of perpetrating
terrorist acts or associating with terrorists before an international
tribunal, or subject an accused to extraterritorial jurisdiction. Secrecy
is crucial for defending nations to succeed in gaining strategic
advantage against terrorists. So, in the interest of national security,
certain information may be withheld. Disclosure of such information
can be construed as being prejudicial to the national security interest
of the nation; yet, the information may be crucial to the determination
of individual responsibility of the doer. Domestic security is
prejudiced when evidence is revealed. In terrorism, evidence often
relies on the unencumbered discretion of the concerned state, so
withholding evidence would bar any investigation by the ICC.138
In 1998, the French High Court overturned a court of appeal’s
dismissal of a case brought against a foreign national living in
138. In Australia, Faheem Khalid Lodhi, a 34-year-old Pakistani-born Australian citizen was accused
of terrorism. Mike Head, Secret Evidence Used in Australian “Terrorist” Trial, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB
SITE, Dec. 20, 2004, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/dec2004/terr-d20.shtml. Under the National
Security Information Act, his trial was in complete or partial secrecy. The act calls for closed court
sessions, witnesses testify in disguise via video and, in some circumstances, exclude defendants and
their lawyers from trial proceedings. Failure of a lawyer to obtain a security clearance excludes them
from secret sessions and from viewing transcripts. Juries can convict a defendant without seeing key
evidence. The prosecution can withhold testimony or other material from the accused and present it to
the jury in summarized and censored form. Id.
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France.139 The defendant, a Rwandan priest, had been charged with
participating in torture, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The
court of appeal ruling, that French courts lacked universal jurisdiction
over acts of genocide committed abroad by a foreign national, was
overturned on the grounds that the acts committed could also be
qualified as acts of torture, triggering universal jurisdiction under
Article 689-2 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure.140
CONCLUSION
The future of fighting terrorism depends on the will of nations to
resist those who resort to extreme violence as a means of promoting a
cause or seeking redress. Yet, the problematic obstacles of
determining whether terrorism rises to the level of crimes invoking
universal jurisdiction, at least for now, are too controversial to be
resolved absent a greater understanding of terrorism in domestic and
international forums. Subjecting terrorism to an international forum
of adjudication also presents problems in the definitions and
distinctions of transnational crimes and international crimes. Much
care must be given to sorting out the impact of terrorism on both
types of crimes in order to determine the proper forum.
If acts of terrorism found to be of an international and
extraterritorial nature are construed to warrant universal jurisdiction,
then what becomes of domestic acts of terrorism that have all the
hallmarks of crimes against humanity and other acts so abhorrent as
to shock the conscious of nations? If, for example, Osama bin Laden
were to be apprehended, how would his answering for his alleged
crimes be handled? If he were not to be adjudicated in an
international criminal court where all nations who suffered the loss of
citizens and property in one heinous act could be represented, then
139. Munyeshyaka Case, Cour de cassation, Chambre criminelle [Criminal Chamber, Court of
Cassation], No. 96-82491, Jan. 6, 1998, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte=JURITEXT000007069907&dateTexte=.
140. See Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project RULAC, The Munyeshyaka Case–Rwanda,
http://www.adh-geneva.ch/RULAC/national_judical_decitions.php?id_state=67 (last visited Feb. 25,
2009).
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one could envision a seemingly endless succession of one nation after
another requesting bin Laden to answer charges of terrorism in
domestic courts for crimes determined to be of a transnational rather
than of an international nature. Quite likely, bin Laden would live out
his lifespan before the nations involved would be able to bring him to
the bar before their own courts of justice.
Hopefully, in the meantime nations will continue to seek
cooperative means to combat terrorism both domestically and
transnationally so that crimes of terrorism will be subject to a
universal-like standard of rebuke and nations will seek to combat
terrorism through the drafting and enforcement of anti-terrorism
legislation that is tough on terrorists but remains accountable to all
members of a civil society.
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